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ABSTRACT
Improvised explosivse devices (IEDs) are the cause of many casulaties worldwide. Current
methods for detecting IEDs are insufficient. A signature-based scanning technique based
upon the fact that explosives consist primarily of hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, and carbon
is examined as a possible rapid, standoff method for detecting IEDs. Devices employing
this method rely on a template-matching technique in which the detector responses acquired
through neutron and photon interrogation are compared to responses from a known explosive.
A figure-of-merit is calculated to determine how well the template and the unknown match.
This thesis explores the feasibility of employing the neutron interrogation aspect of this
method.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Background
1.1 Introduction
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) caused 2,398 deaths and 22,378 injuries to members of
the United States military during the Global War on Terrorism between October 7, 2001
and April 4, 2009 [1]. In addition, numerous bystanders have been injured or killed. Many
of these explosive devices are hidden and detonated in automobiles. Currently, vehicles en-
tering military bases, embassies, and other similarly access-controlled locations are checked
for explosives by physical search, x-rays, or scent dogs [2]. Physical searches are time con-
suming and could be unsafe for the searcher. X-rays are inconclusive when used on vehicles
because their primary function is to detect metals, which make up a significant portion of an
automobile. Scent dogs can be unreliable and get tired after several searches. One can only
conclude that current methods of detecting explosives are insufficient. Thus, it is necessary
to create a rapid, non-intrusive system for detecting explosives if the number of casualties
due to IEDs is to be reduced.
1.2 System Requirements
An explosive device consists of three primary components: an explosive, a detonator, and
packaging. Historically, detection has been based upon detecting the packaging because it
often is metal. Recently, it has become more common to use wood or plasitc for the pack-
aging [3]. Therefore, detecting the packaging has become an unreliable method. Detection
1
methods based upon finding the explosive and/or detonator must be developed. This project
focuses on detecting the explosive.
The most commonly used explosives consist primarily of hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and
nitrogen. Further, the fraction of an explosive’s molecules consisting of nitrogen and oxygen is
high and the fraction consisting of carbon and hydrogen is low. In addition, the density of an
explosive typically ranges from 1.2 to 2.0 grams per cubic centimeter [4, 5], which is greater
than the density of most organic materials but less than the density of most metals [6].
Therefore, a successful explosives detection system will be able to not only identify the
presence of hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and nitrogen, but also determine the ratio of one
element’s composition to another’s. The system should also have a low false alarm rate and
be able to detect the presence of an explosive material with other inert materials present.
Nuclear-based methods, particularly neutron interrogation, are useful because the ele-
ments hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and nitrogen vastly differ in their modes of interaction
with neutrons. These differences allow researchers to determine which of these elements are
present. Neutrons are a beneficial method of interrogation because they penetrate an object
one to two meters without much attenuation, even steel casings [7–9]. This allows a neutron
interrogation system to be non-intrusive, i.e, a package or vehicle can be examined without
having to unpack it. Additionally, electromagnetic forces have no impact on neutrons so
they interact only with nuclei, which contributes to their large penetration ability.
Neutron sources are readily available as radioisotope sources and as neutron generators.
Neutron generators accelerate nuclear particles that are used to bombard deuterium, tritium,
or beryllium. The particles react with a target to produce neutrons. Most radioisotope
sources and generators are portable. However, sources cannot be turned ”on” and ”off” as
can neutron generators, which makes generators safer when not in use.
An interrogation system must also meet strict safety standards. Neutrons are particularly
hazardous and must be properly shielded. The user must also be safe, so a system that can
be operated remotely is desired. It must also be constructed so that if an accident were to
occur, little or no radiation would be released.
Finally, the system must rapidly interrogate an unknown and quickly analyze the results.
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The entire process should take only a few minutes.
1.3 Neutron Interactions
Neutrons are either scattered or absorbed. In scattering, a neutron collides with a nucleus
and loses an element-dependent amount of energy. The nucleus is either left in the ground
state but with additional kinetic energy (elastic scattering) or in an excited state (inelas-
tic scattering). In inelastic scattering, the nucleus usually returns to the ground state by
emission of an inelastic scatter gamma ray, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. When a neutron is
absorbed a compound nucleus in an excited state often results. The excited nucleus returns
to the ground state by emitting one or more capture gamma rays, as illustrated in Figure 1.2.
These gamma rays are characteristic of the target nucleus. Other absorption interactions
lead to emission of neutrons, protons, deuterons, or other charged particles including fission
fragments.
1.4 Device Operation Principles
Signature-based interrogation relies on a template-matching technique. Detector responses
are acquired through neutron and photon interrogation of an unknown object and are com-
pared to a ”template” consisting of detector responses that are typical of those from a known
explosive. Then, a figure-of-merit is calculated to determine how well, statistically, the tem-
plate matches the unknown and the figure-of-merit serves as an indication of the probability
that the unknown object contains an explosive. A database of explosive templates will be
created for different types of packaging. This method differs from many other interrogation
techniques in using both photon and neutron interrogation, which provides more information
than using either individually. The research discussed in this thesis focuses on the neutron
interrogation portion of the explosives identification method.
3
Fig. 1.1. Inelastic Neutron Scattering
(from http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/DisplayImage.cfm?ID=644)
Fig. 1.2. Neutron Absorption
(from http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/DisplayImage.cfm?ID=645)
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Chapter 2
Existing Explosive Detection Methods
There are currently a wide variety of methods for detecting explosives. Some work better
than others and some are applicable to certain specific situations. Several methods are
discussed below.
2.1 Metal Detectors
A rudimentary method of detecting explosives is use of the metal detector. It is comprised
of a coil that generates a magnetic field [3, 10] that is disturbed by metal objects. Although
light weight [10], this device is unreliable. It can only be used to detect explosives encased in
metal. In addition, metal detectors cannot be used to detect explosives within most vehicles
because metal components of the vehicle would result in too many false positives.
2.2 X-Ray Radiography
Sometimes called Roentgenography [11], x-ray radiography depends on the absorption co-
efficients and atomic numbers of the elements in an object. This type of system does not
actually detect explosives, but rather explosive-like characteristics. Advantages of x-ray ra-
diography are that it is safer for humans and objects being tested than other methods [12],
it is a well understood method, and it is inexpensive compared to neutron-based methods.
X-ray machines are reasonably sized [4, 5], have a ten to fifteen foot standoff potential [13],
and x-ray devices are acceptable to the general public. A major disadvantage is the depe-
nence upon a human to interpret an image properly. Since explosives can be molded into
5
infinitely many forms, they cannot be recognized by shape. Objects of similar density ap-
pear identical and high density objects can obscure lower density objects. Typically, x-ray
systems have a high false positive rate due to these shortfalls. In addition, the elements
hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, and carbon, of which the majority of explosives are primarily
composed, have low interaction probabilities with x radiation [4, 5]. Four specific types of
radiography are discussed below.
2.2.1 Transmission Radiography
Also called conventional or single-energy x rays, this method measures how much an x-ray
beam is attenuated after passing through the object in question. An image of the object
is created in which the areas where the beam is less intense appear darker. In this system,
a thin strong absorber and a thick weak absorber appear identical. [12] Although images
are produced with a high resolution [13], they are only indicative of bomb parts such as
fusing, wiring, and metal and not of explosives themselves [14]. The detector and source are
required to be on opposite sides of the object in question [13]. The images produced via
transmission x rays do not provide enough information for the detection of explosives.
2.2.2 Dual-Energy Radiography
The object is scanned at two energy levels, e.g., once at about 80 kV and once at above 100
kV. At the lower energy level, the absorption is dependent upon the thickness and atomic
number of the object material. At the higher energy absorption is dependent on density. [12]
A transmission image is created at each energy and the two images are compared to determine
if explosives are present [12, 14]. Carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen are dark in the low energy
image, but not in the high energy image [12]. The false positive rate of this type of system
is roughly twenty percent [15].
2.2.3 Backscatter Radiography
An image from the x rays reflected back toward the x-ray source (backscatter image) is
created and in addition another image may be created via the transmission method described
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above (forward scattering image) [12, 14]. The backscatter image is dependent upon how
much energy is absorbed during forward scattering, how much energy is backscattered, and
how many x rays reach the backscatter detectors [12]. Hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and
nitrogen are more efficient at scattering x rays and therefore stand out more (are darker)
on backscatter images while they are barely visible in transmission images [9]. Both the
forward scatter and backscatter images are affected by the object’s placement in relation to
the x-ray source and the detectors [12]. Although the resolution of images generated via
this method is not as good as images produced via transmission x rays, backscatter x rays
give more information than transmission x rays [13] since the forward scatter image provides
information on high density materials and the backscatter image provides information on
organic materials [14].
2.2.4 Computed Tomography
In tomographic imaging, images are constructed from the transmission of photons through
an object. The image is a function of the object’s attenuation coefficient(s). [11] The sources
and detector are rotated around the object so a cross-sectional image of the object can
be obtained. The cost of operating a computed tomography system is high [12, 14] and the
system results in a higher radiation dose than x-rays and therefore requires more shielding [9,
14]. It can be difficult and time consuming to obtain transmission measurements of a target
at many angles. The data analysis is also a time-consuming process [13].
2.3 Spectroscopy
In spectroscopic analysis, a small sample of the object in question is burned and the light
emitted is dispersed through a prism. The color and thickness of the spectral lines is char-
acteristic of the composition and density of the object. [11] Obviously, this method cannot
be used on an explosive device as the explosive would detonate when burned.
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2.4 Nuclear Magnetic Resonance
Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) imaging uses radiofrequency photons. The object is
placed in a strong magnetic field in which radiofrequency photons are absorbed by neutrons.
The neutrons then de-excite by releasing a photon of almost the same energy as the original
photon. The material of an object can be identified because different elements absorb ra-
diofrequency photons of different frequencies. Only elements with odd numbers of protons
can be imaged because pairs of protons and neutrons cancel one another out. [11] Addition-
ally, since a high-powered magnet is used, NMR cannot be applied to objects containing or
encased in metal [6].
2.5 Neutron Activation Analysis
The object is bombarded with neutrons and results in the production of radioactive isotopes.
Whereas an object can be moderated by neutrons and the residual gamma rays emitted by
radioisotopes can, in principle, be used to identify the nuclides present, this technique is not
good for explosives detection because the half lives of nuclides vary considerably and the
elements typically found in explosives do not produce many radioisotopes.
2.6 Thermal Neutron Activation
The primary objective of a thermal neutron activation (TNA R©) system is to identify ni-
trogen, usually via detection of the 10.83-MeV capture gamma ray from 14N. Neutrons
produced by a radioisotope source or a neutron generator are moderated (thermalized) to
thermal energies that average about 0.025 eV. The thermal neutrons then bombard the ob-
ject in question and a fraction of the neutrons are absorbed by the nuclei of the elements
within the object. The nuclei de-excite by emitting prompt gamma rays of energy character-
istic of the nuclei. This system can only be used to determine if an element such as nitrogen
is present, not for what use it is intended, i.e., the results of analysis are the same for an
explosive containing nitrogen and a fertilizer containing nitrogen. Due to this characteristic,
there can be a high false positive rate [12, 14]. This method has limited sensitivity and can
8
be quite expensive [12, 14]. It also must be corrected for background created by thermal
neutron interactions with shielding, detectors, and surrounding materials. It cannot be used
to identify carbon or oxygen [16, 17], and is slow compared to other neutron interrogation
methods [10, 16]. TNA R© can be used to detect as few as 200 g of explosive material [12], but
is unable to interrogate large targets due to the limited penetration ability of thermalized
neutrons.
2.7 Fast Neutron Analysis
Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA) identifies not only nitrogen, as in the TNA R© method, but
also hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon. It uses high energy fast neutrons, usually from a neutron
generator, to excite nuclei via inelastic scattering and the nuclei de-excite by releasing char-
acteristic gamma rays. The gamma rays are detected by several detectors surrounding the
object in question [18, 19]. The intensity of the gamma rays is indicative of the amount of an
element within an object while the energy is indicative of the type of element. The intensity
can be used to calculate elemental ratios. [9] However, the use of high energy neutrons causes
a high background in the gamma ray detectors which skew the results. This method does not
require the use of moderators, as in TNA R©, which makes the system have less mass and be
more portable [6]. More complex than TNA R©, FNA provides more accurate results [9, 10].
2.8 Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis
Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis (PFNA R©) is similar to FNA, except the neutron source is
pulsed instead of a constant stream in an attempt to reduce the high gamma ray back-
ground that occurs in FNA. The neutron pulses are usually nanoseconds long and must be
as monoenergetic as possible in order to ensure that all neutrons travel at identical veloci-
ties [9, 10, 20]. Pulses are usually about 8 MeV [5, 21]. The neutrons produce gamma rays
through inelastic scattering and the gammas are detected with an array of thallium doped
sodium iodide (NaI(Tl)) detectors [5, 20]. The time from the start of the neutron pulse to
the detection of a gamma ray is measured. This allows for the determination of not only
9
elemental composition of the object, but also the spatial location of the elements within the
object. One major setback to PFNA R© is that it is difficult to create an efficient high energy
pulsed neutron source that can be safely operated and is cost effective [10, 12]. However,
PFNA R© devices have a false positive rate of less than five percent [12].
2.9 Pulsed Fast Neutron Transmission Spectroscopy
First used by Overly [20, 22], nanosecond pulsed beams of neutrons attenuate when passing
through an object [23, 24]. The neutron beam energy is measured before and after transmis-
sion [20]. A pulsed fast neutron transmission spectroscopy (PFNTS) system is costly, heavy,
and can be unsafe [5]. Since this is a transmission method, it requires that the object be
between the source and detector [6].
2.10 Pulsed Fast/Thermal Neutron Analysis
Pulsed fast/thermal neutron analysis (PFTNA) is essentially a combination of the TNA R©
and PFNA R© methods. A neutron generator produces a beam of microsecond long pulses
and the resulting inelastic scatter gammas are measured. After a series of pulses, the gener-
ator is turned off for approximately 100 microseconds and prompt gammas from the capture
of thermal neutrons are measured [9, 10, 25]. This system usually employs a bismuth ger-
manate (BGO) or gadolium ortho-silicate (GSO) detector [25]. The data acquisition can
be performed in as few as thirty seconds [25], but as with any system, the longer the data
acquisition time, the more accurate the measurement.
2.11 Neutron Backscattering
The objective of neutron backscattering (NBS) is to determine hydrogen content within an
object [26–28]. It is based upon the principle that explosives contain a higher concentration
of hydrogen than inert materials [27, 28]. The method was introduced in 1999 by F.D.
Brooks with the intended application of detecting land mines [27].
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An object under question is interrogated by bombarding it with a beam of fast neutrons.
Neutrons scattered and thermalized by the object are then detected with a thermal neu-
tron detector. If hydrogen is present, the neutrons will undergo more moderation than in
non-hydrogenous materials resulting in a higher thermal neutron flux in the hydrogenous
material. An NBS system quickly scans an object for explosives. It is insensitive to metals,
which allows for the detection of explosives that do not contain metal and for application in
detecting explosives in automobiles. However, moisture content of the atmosphere impacts
the effectiveness of the system - a high moisture content causes hydrogen rich materials to
be indistinguishable from the atmosphere. In addition, false positives can result from inert
hydrogen rich materials such as water and plastics [27].
2.12 Fast Neutron Scattering Analysis
A monoenergetic neutron beam alternating between two energies bombards an object in
question [4, 5, 29]. Neutrons scattered by the object are detected at forward and backward
angles as shown in Figure 2.1 [4, 5, 24]. The type, number, intensity, and scattering angle
of the neutrons are characteristic of the elements composing the object [4]. An explosives
signature is created by combining measurements from the two detectors [4, 5].
2.13 Associated Particle Imaging
Associated Particle Imaging (API) uses the alpha particle from the 3H(d,n)4He reaction in
the production of 14-MeV neutrons to ”tag” the neutron. A 3.5 MeV alpha particle is emitted
at the same time as and 180o from each 14-MeV neutron. The tagging of the neutron allows
for close monitoring of the neutron’s direction, which allows for spatial mapping without a
pulsed neutron beam. As in FNA and PFNA R©, the characteristic gamma rays are used to
determine the elemental composition of the object. [5, 6, 30]
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2.14 Nuclear Quadruple Resonance
Nuclear Quadruple Resonance (NQR) detects the electric quadrupole moment in 14N [6, 10].
A radiofrequency signal is applied to the object in question [10, 14] moving 14N to a higher
energy state [14]. If 14N is present, a radio signal will be produced when the radiofrequency
signal is removed [10]. The radio signal is unique to 14N and can be detected with a radio
receiver [8, 10]. This method produces no ionizing radiation [14] which makes it safer than
most of the other methods detailed in this chapter. However, the radio signal is usually weak
which means the target must be in close proximity to the radiofrequency field, therefore,
this method can only be used on small items [14]. In addition, the radio signal can be
indistinguishable from electronic noise [6] and the system is expensive and requires large
amounts of power [31].
2.15 Projects Employing Methods
2.15.1 Improved Landmine Detection System
The Canadian Department of National Defense (DND) in conjunction with General Dynam-
ics Canada (GDC) created a multisensor system to detect landmines after concluding that no
single detection method could successfully determine the presence of a landmine [16]. This
system, called the Improved Landmine Detection System (ILDS) employs an electromagnetic
induction metal detector, a ground probing radar, and a forward-looking infrared imager as
primary detection methods in the first vehicle [10, 16]. If a landmine is suspected, a TNA R©
system housed in a second vehicle is then used as a secondary detection method [10, 16, 32].
An illustration of the system can be found in Figure 2.2. This TNA R© system is based upon
detection of the 10.83-MeV prompt gamma from nitrogen. The DND chose to only look at
the single prompt gamma because there are few competing gammas at that energy, nitrogen
has a relatively high thermal neutron capture cross-section, and a thallium doped sodium
iodide (NaI(Tl)) detector can be used instead of a bulkier germanium detector. The system
is equipped with a 108 neutrons per second 252Cf source, four 3x3 NaI(Tl) detectors at ninety
degree intervals, and a source to detector distance of 30 cm. This system was found to be
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able to detect landmines within a 1200 cm2 radial area and nitrogen concentration as low as
100 grams in as little as five minutes. [32]
2.15.2 Delft University Neutron Backscattering Imaging Detector
The Delft University Neutron Backscattering Imaging Detector (DUNBID) employs neutron
backscattering to detect explosives [27]. It consists of 16 parallel 3He proportional counters
in a 80 cm by 70 cm by 7 cm box [10, 27]. The detectors are made of aluminum, are 50
cm long, and are 2.5 cm in diameter. A 0.5 mm cadmium sheet is on top of the detectors
to filter out slow neutrons. The neutron source is a 7000 neutron per second 252Cf source
placed in the center of the detector array. [27] The entire apparatus weighs approximately
10 kg [27] and is mounted on a remote control vehicle [10].
2.15.3 Delft University Neutron Backscattering Landmine Detec-
tor
The Delft University Neutron Backscattering Landmine Detector (DUNBLAD) was devel-
oped by the same team that developed the DUNBID. The DUNBLAD employs both metal
detection and neutron backscattering. The DUNBLAD uses eight 50 cm long, 2.54 cm di-
ameter 3He detectors divided into two groups of four placed 18 cm apart and a 252Cf source
between the two sets of four detectors. The downside to using the 252Cf source is that it
cannot be turned off. The DUNBLAD would need to be constructed so that if an accident
were to occur, no additional radioactive material would be released. However, the advantage
of the neutron source over a neutron generator is that the neutron source can be carried by
a person while a neutron generator would need to be on a cart or wheeled platform. [28]
The neutron backscatter and metal detector apparatuses are encased in polychlorotriflu-
orethylene, a plastic containing no hydrogen. The DUNBLAD has two 1.5 m carbon fiber
poles and is carried by a person as shown in Figure 2.3. The weight of the detector is bal-
anced by batteries, which will run up to eight hours. The detector is workable but would
ideally be lighter as it weighs approximately 18 kg. It also does not work very well on uneven
terrain. [28]
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Fig. 2.1. FNSA Schematic
(Adapted from [4])
Fig. 2.2. Improved Landmine Detection System
from [33]
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Fig. 2.3. DUNBLAD Apparatus
from [28]
2.15.4 Pulsed Elemental Analysis with Neutrons
The Pulsed Elemental Analysis with Neutrons (PELAN) system, created by Ancore (for-
merly Science Applications International Corporation) uses PFTNA by employing a pulsed
deuterium-tritium neutron generator [10, 29, 34, 35]. It consists of two primary units: one
composed of the power supply and neutron generator and the other of a BGO gamma ray
detector and shielding [25, 34, 35]. The entire apparatus weighs approximately 40 kg [34, 35].
The neutron generator provides 10 microsecond pulses of 14-MeV neutrons [29, 34, 35]. The
system is fully automated and is controlled with a palm or laptop computer [25, 34, 35].
The PELAN takes five minutes to analyze an object, is unaffected by temperature, and
can operate up to six hours before its twelve volt battery must be recharged [10, 35]. The
system compares the measurements to previous measurements to determine if an explosive
is present [25]. The creators of the device see it as a confirmatory sensor [35].
2.15.5 Z R© Backscatter PortalTM and Z R© Backscatter VanTM
Both the Z R© Backscatter Portal and Z R© Backscatter Van use transmission and backscatter
x rays to create images of vehicles. The portal, shown in Figure 2.4 uses an array of 225 keV
x-ray beams to create real-time images of vehicles traveling around six miles per hour. One
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Fig. 2.4. Z Backscatter Portal
from http://www.as-e.com/products solutions/cargo vehicle inspection.asp
scan produces one transmission image and three backscatter images. The transmission image
displays the approximate density of the vehicle contents while the backscatter images, which
are taken to the left, right, and above the vehicle, can be used to get an idea of the contents
of the vehicle. The van, shown in Figure 2.5, uses a similar array of x-ray beams to create
a single backscatter image. It is powered by an on-board generator so it can interrogate an
object while the van is in motion. [36]
2.15.6 Other Projects
In addition to the projects described above, GE Security is creating a Quadrupole Resonance
Confirmation Sensor (QRCS) that employs NQR [10]. The Nanosecond Neutron Analysis
System (SENNA) uses API to find carbon to oxygen and oxygen to nitrogen ratios [10]. The
Detection and Imaging of Anti-Personnel Landmines by Neutron Backscattering Techniques
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Fig. 2.5. Z Backscatter Van
from http://www.as-e.com/products solutions/cargo vehicle inspection.asp
(DIAMINE) system uses a 252Cf source to emit neutrons that backscatter with probability
inversely proportional to the atomic number of the scattering element and undergo a residual
energy loss that is also inversely proportional to the atomic number of the scattering element.
The Hydrogen Density Anomaly Detection (HYDAD) system uses a AmBe or 252Cf source
and one or more neutron detectors to detect neutrons moderated by hydrogen [10, 29]. The
source-detector geometry is similar to that of DUNBLAD’s but data processing and analysis
are different [37].
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Chapter 3
Theory of Signature-Based Radiation
Scanning
The proposed method of explosives detection, introduced by Dunn et. al. [38], employs
some of the concepts behind the methods detailed in Chapter 2. However, it differers from
the techniques in that it seeks to detect if an explosive is present rather than measure the
unknown object’s content.
A photon and/or neutron beam is aimed at a target. Detectors, placed on the same
side of the object as the photon and/or neutron beam record backscattered and generated
responses. A figure-of-merit is used to calculate the statistical match between the template
and the responses acquired. The neutron interrogation method is based on fast and thermal
neutron backscattering and neutron-induced gamma rays from hydrogen, oxygen, carbon,
and nitrogen. Hydrogen and nitrogen emit 2.223-MeV and 10.83-MeV prompt gamma rays,
respectively, via neutron capture. Carbon emits a 4.43-MeV inelastic-scatter gamma ray;
nitrogen emits 1.64-MeV, 2.31-MeV, and 5.11-MeV inelastic-scatter gamma rays; and oxy-
gen emits a 6.128-MeV inelastic-scatter gamma ray. The response, Ri, at each energy i is
measured and compared to the template, Sli, which is the response of a known explosive in
configuration l. Ri and Sli are used to calculate the figure-of-merit for a given configuration
using Equation 3.1 below.
ςl =
N∑
i=1
αi
(βRi − Sli)2
β2σ2 (Ri) + σ2 (Sli)
, (3.1)
where N is the number of responses, β scales the response to match the template, and αi is
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a normalized weight factor defined as
αi =
ωi∑N
i=1 ωi
, (3.2)
where ωi is the weight factor for the i
th response, and σ2(Ri) is the variance of Ri and σ
2(Sli)
is the variance of Sli. Also, it can be shown that the standard deviation of the figure-of-merit
can be expressed as
σ (ςl) = 2
[
N∑
i=1
α2i
(βRi − Sli)2
β2σ2 (Ri) + σ2 (Sli)
] 1
2
, (3.3)
A cutoff value ς0 will be established. If ς > ς0 it is unlikely that the target contains an
explosive; if ς ≤ ς0 the target is likely to contain an explosive. A database of templates
reflecting several different common explosives in a variety of environments can be created.
Advantages of this method over those discussed in Chapter 2 include:
• a simplified process due to detecting the presence of an explosive rather than measuring
the amount of explosive,
• does not require human interpretation of the response to determine if an explosive is
present, and
• can be operated remotely, which increases the safety of the operator.
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Chapter 4
Experiments and Results
4.1 Experimental Setup
The general setup for the experiments included the following equipment
• an aluminum box
• a Canberra high purity germanium (HPGe) detector model GC2019 (serial number
04057961) with cryostat model 7600 SI and preamplifier model 2002CSI
• the Kansas State University TRIGA Mark II Nuclear Research Reactor tangential
beam port
• Canberra Genie 2000 3.1 computer software
• Canberra InSpector 2000 Model IN2K (serial number 05032284)
A photograph of the setup is shown in Figure 4.1. A typical spectrum produced by the Genie
software is shown in Figure 4.2.
4.1.1 TRIGA Mark II Reactor
The Kansas State University TRIGA Mark II Nuclear Research Reactor tangential beam
port is an aluminum tube six inches in diameter surrounded by an eight inch diameter
cadmium-lined steel tube. The center of the beam tube is 2.75 inches below the reactor core
centerline [39].
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Fig. 4.1. Photograph of One Experimental Configuration
Fig. 4.2. Example Spectrum
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4.1.2 Aluminum Box
The aluminum box was constructed of 0.0625 inch thick aluminum sheets. The box has
dimensions of 3 feet by 3 feet by 3 feet When placed in front of the beam port it is raised
17.25 inches above the floor with a wooden pallet. Inside the box is a wood and aluminum
platform that raises the sample 14.25 inches above the bottom of the box.
4.1.3 Samples Tested
The samples were selected based upon their representation of a number of chemicals and
densities or based upon their common presence in vehicles. The samples tested on the various
experiment dates include silica sand, water, calcium carbonate (chalk), rubber (mulched),
aluminum, fertilizer, antifreeze, windshield washer fluid, black car paint, soybeans, and
polyethylene. Three types of fertilizer were used to simulate explosives: the two listed
in Table 4.1 and a 50-50 mixture of the two.
Table 4.1. Types of Fertilizer
Manufacturer Brand Name % 14N
Free Flow Green Thumb Premium Lawn Fertilizer 30-3-3 30
Scotts Lawn Pro Super Turf Builder w/ Halts Crabgrass Preventer 36-3-4 36
4.2 Experiments
4.2.1 October 25, 2005
The experiment performed October 25, 2005 used a 20% efficient HPGe detector, a Bicron
model 802-3x3 three by three NaI detector (serial number 08067856) connected to a Canberra
Unispec (serial number 22060239), and a 3He detector with the NIM components listed in
Table 4.2. The experiment configuration is shown in Figure 4.3. A two gallon plastic can
containing disel fuel was placed inside the aluminum box as well as a one gallon paint can
filled with granulated sugar. The samples were contained in 10 gallon drums. The neutron
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Fig. 4.3. October 25, 2005 Experiment Configuration
detector was set to a high voltage of 800 V, a coarse gain of 8, and a fine gain of 0. The lower
and upper level discriminators were set at 24 and 100, respectively. The reactor operated
at 240 kW and data were taken for forty minutes of live time, twenty minutes of which a
cadmium sheet was placed in front of the neutron detector.
The data acquired from the neutron detector are shown in Table 4.3. The counts and
standard deviation obtained from the Genie software outputs for the pertinent energies are
shown in Table 4.4. The pertinent NaI data from the Genie software output are shown
in Table 4.5. The figure-of-merit for each sample was calculated using the thirty percent
fertilizer as the template. These values are shown in Table 4.6.
The results for all these inert samples are significantly greater than zero indicating that
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Table 4.2. NIM Components
Component Make Model Serial Number
NIM Bin Tennelec TB3 6079
NIM Power Supply Tennelec TC911-6 251
Pre-Amplifier Canberra 2006 07041903
High Voltage Power Supply Bertran 353 800
Amplifier Canberra 2012 681933
Single Channel Analyzer Ortec 406A 2604
Scaler Canberra 1773 481210
Counter/Timer Tennelec TC545A 200
Table 4.3. Neutron Data - October 25, 2005
Sample Ri without Cd σ(Ri) Ri with Cd σ(Ri)
Air 2193 47 2048 45
Aluminum 2736 52 2308 48
Fertilizer 30 3393 58 2813 53
Sand 3374 58 2624 51
Water 3939 63 3245 57
they are not explosives. From the results, it can be concluded that inert samples tend to
give large figure-of-merit values, hopefully allowing differentiation from explosives.
4.2.2 April 20, 2006
The experiment performed April 20, 2006 used the HPGe and Bicron model 802-3x3 three
by three NaI detectors used on October 25, 2005 connected to the same Canberra Unispec.
The aluminum box was placed 94 inches from the beam collimator with a car windshield
in from of it. The HPGe detector was 57 inches from the center of the beam and the NaI
detector was 46 inches from the center of the beam on the side of the beam opposite the
HPGe detector. The samples were placed in ten gallon drums. The samples tested were
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Table 4.4. HPGe Data - October 25,2005
Ri (i in MeV) Air Aluminum Fertilizer 30 Sand Water
R0.871 15825 15713 19084 15233 15161
σ(R0.871) 509 2901 2777 2991 3543
R1.262 507 857 1183 0 1734
σ(R1.262) 44 74 90 0 160
R1.64 437 951 0 366 0
σ(R1.64) 232 237 0 277 345
R1.885 1555 0 0 55 404
σ(R1.885) 504 0 300 32 292
R2.223 8968 15340 22156 14866 76398
σ(R2.223) 475 1390 239 334 771
R2.31 0 103 716 270 0
σ(R2.31) 0 207 101 226 0
R4.43 1436 1024 1132 2265 1152
σ(R4.43) 307 79 248 271 90
R4.945 767 1236 14 2730 1267
σ(R4.945) 52 64 446 76 66
R5.11 0 0 0 0 0
σ(R5.11) 0 169 0 0 0
rubber, aluminum, silica sand, fertilizer 30%, polyethylene, and an empty barrel (air). Each
sample was analyzed for 1200 seconds live time. The reactor operated at 240 kW.
The counts and standard deviation obtained from the Genie software outputs for the
pertinent energies are shown in Table 4.7. The pertinent NaI data from the Genie software
output are shown in Table 4.8. The figures-of-merit for the neutron induced gamma ray data
from the HPGe with the fertilizer 30% serving as the template are listed in Table 4.9.
The data obtained from the NaI detector were not specific enough for analysis and there-
fore were not used in calculating the figures-of-merit. A high number of counts only occur at
a few energies, most of which are the result of backscattering. These data are not as useful
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Table 4.5. NaI(Tl) Data - October 25, 2005
Ri (i in MeV) Air Al Fert30 Sand Water
R0.871 0 28601 0 0 0
σ(R0.871) 0 2613 0 0
R1.262 0 0 0 15811 0
σ(R1.262) 0 0 0 1645 0
R1.64 0 0 0 18377 0
σ(R1.64) 0 0 0 1161 0
R1.885 0 0 0 37760 0
σ(R1.885) 0 0 0 1131
Table 4.6. October 25, 2005 Figures-of-Merit
Sample ς σ(ς)
Air 276.420 5.766
Aluminum 45.903 3.681
Sand 136.491 4.834
Water 1163.937 8.260
as the HPGe data, so use of the NaI detector for detection of neutron induced gamma rays
was discontinued in all subsequent experiments.
The figures-of-merit for all the inert samples were again significantly greater than zero
indicating that they are not explosives. From the results, it can be concluded that inert
samples tend to give large figure-of-merit values differentiating them from the fertilizer.
4.2.3 May 7, 2007
The experiment performed May 7, 2007 used the HPGe detector as well as two Scionix
Holland type 25B3/LM-E1-L-X europium doped lithium iodide (LiI(Eu)) neutron detectors
(serial numbers SAV804 and SAV805) each with a Spectrum Techniques Spectech Model
ST360 counters (serial numbers 1219 and 1221). The neutron detector crystals are 25 mil-
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Table 4.7. HPGe Data - April 20, 2006
Ri (i in MeV) Air Al Fert30 Poly Rubber Sand
R0.871 3487 4989 5955 6951 6891 6144
σ(R0.871) 234 111 171 166 187 191
R1.262 0 428 353 610 698 479
σ(R1.262) 0 44 53 68 61 55
R1.64 0 0 154 0 0 0
σ(R1.64) 0 0 77 0 0 0
R1.885 0 0 299 0 0 0
σ(R1.885) 0 0 80 0 0 0
R2.223 3760 5543 12356 33726 22472 6361
σ(R2.223) 132 123 159 221 191 129
R2.31 0 138 0 0 0 0
σ(R2.31) 0 57 0 0 0 0
limeters by 3 millimeters and are mounted in an aluminum housing with a Mu-metal shield
and a built in voltage divider of 6 megaohms. Each of the Spectech counters was set to a
high voltage of 380 V. The aluminum box was placed 88 inches from the beam collimator
with a car windshield in front of it. The HPGe detector was 54 inches in front of and 63.75
inches from the center of the beam. Both neutron detectors were 50 inches in front of and
79.2 inches from the center of the beam. The bare neutron detector was 33.5 inches above
the floor and the cadmium covered detector was 30 inches above the floor. The samples
were placed in 5 gallon buckets. The buckets are 13 inches tall with an inner diameter
of 11.5 inches and an outer diameter of 11.875 inches. The samples tested were rubber,
aluminum, silica sand, water, calcium carbonate, fertilizer 30-3-3, fertilizer 36-3-4, fertilizer
mix, polyethylene, and an empty barrel (air). Each sample was analyzed for 2000 seconds.
The reactor operated at 120 kW.
The data acquired from the neutron detector are shown in Table 4.10. The counts and
standard deviation obtained from the Genie software outputs for the pertinent energies are
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Table 4.8. NaI(Tl) Data - April 20, 2006
Ri (i in MeV) Air Al Fert30 Poly Rubber Sand
R0.871 1089482 55359 0 0 83177 0
σ(R0.871) 114 6834 0 0 6883 0
R1.262 1077451 0 0 38709 0 0
σ(R1.262) 110 0 0 1942 0 0
R1.64 0 0 0 0 0 77114
σ(R1.64) 0 0 0 0 0 5931
R1.885 0 160548 34660 32717 20103 37457
σ(R1.885) 0 8188 6893 3143 2899 8418
R2.223 0 186233 81153 372937 297710 192045
σ(R2.223) 0 7163 7819 22822 15624 8196
Table 4.9. April 20, 2006 Figures-of-Merit
Sample ς σ(ς)
Air 373.023 6.215
Aluminum 239.224 5.562
Polyethylene 1241.095 8.394
Rubber 341.348 6.079
Sand 175.708 5.149
shown in Table 4.11. The figures-of-merit for the neutron and neuton-induced gamma ray
data with the fertilizer mix serving as the template are listed in Table 4.12.
The results of this experiment show significant differences between the simulated explo-
sives and the inert materials. The figures-of-merit for the fertilizers and both less than 10
while all the inert materials have figures-of-merit greater than 75. A good cutoff value for
this experiment would be about 50. It can now be concluded that the template-matching
technique can be used to detect explosives.
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Table 4.10. Neutron Data - May 7, 2007
Sample Ri without Cd σ(Ri) Ri with Cd σ(Ri)
Air 299308 547 37918 195
Aluminum 341670 585 50345 224
Chalk 357442 598 49484 222
Fertilizer 30 333335 577 42262 206
Fertilizer 36 341938 585 43856 209
Fertilizer Mix 337237 581 42191 205
Polyethylene 354355 595 42143 205
Rubber 397901 631 51969 228
Sand 378537 615 53570 231
Water 313774 560 38906 197
4.2.4 August 6, 2007
The experiment performed August 6, 2007 used the HPGe detector as well as the two Scionix
Holland LiI(Eu) neutron detectors each with a Spectrum Techniques Spectech Model ST360
counters set to a high voltage of 380 V. The aluminum box was place 93 inches from the
beam collimator with a car windshield in front of the box. The HPGe detector was 57 inches
in front of and 54 inches from the center of the beam. Both neutron detectors were 50
inches in front of and 79.2 inches from the center of the beam. The bare neutron detector
was 46.5 inches above the floor and the cadmium covered detector was 44.5 inches above
the floor. The samples were placed in one gallon paint cans. Samples tested were rubber,
aluminum, silica sand, water, calcium carbonate, fertilizer 30-3-3, fertilizer 36-3-4, fertilizer
mix, polyethylene, and soybeans. Each sample was analyzed for 1000 seconds. The reactor
operated at 185 kW.
The data acquired from the neutron detector are shown in Table 4.13 and the data
from the HPGe detector are shown in Table 4.14 with the number of counts and standard
deviation obtained from the Genie software outputs. The figures-of-merit for the neutron
and neutron-induced gamma ray data with the fertilizer mix serving as the template are
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Table 4.12. May 7, 2006 Figures-of-Merit
Sample ς σ(ς)
Air 279.483 5.782
Aluminum 99.990 4.472
Chalk 148.225 4.935
Fertilizer 30% 4.747 2.087
Fertilizer 36% 8.065 2.383
Polyethylene 157.628 5.011
Rubber 681.580 13.054
Sand 430.251 7.226
Water 300.102 5.886
listed in Table 4.15.
The results do not display as significant differences between the simulated explosives and
the inert materials as in the May 7, 2007 experiments. This can be attributed to the smaller
sample size. However, the explosives stimulants still have values close to zero and a cut-off
values of about 15 would differentiate inert from explosive-like samples.
4.2.5 August 14, 2007
The experiment performed August 14, 2007 used the HPGe detector as well as the two Scionix
Holland LiI(Eu) neutron detectors each with a Spectrum Techniques Spectech Model ST360
counters set to a high voltage of 380 V. The aluminum box was place 93 inches from the
beam collimator with a car windshield in front of the box. The HPGe detector was 57 inches
in front of and 54 inches from the center of the beam. Both neutron detectors were 50
inches in front of and 79.2 inches from the center of the beam. The bare neutron detector
was 46.5 inches above the floor and the cadmium covered detector was 44.5 inches above
the floor. The samples were placed in one quart paint cans. Samples tested were rubber,
aluminum, silica sand, water, calcium carbonate, fertilizer 30-3-3, fertilizer 36-3-4, fertilizer
mix, polyethylene, antifreeze, black car paint, windshield washer fluid, and an empty barrel
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Table 4.13. Neutron Data - August 6, 2007
Sample Ri without Cd σ(Ri) Ri with Cd σ(Ri)
Aluminum 182523 427 32752 181
Chalk 234920 485 41781 204
Fertilizer 30 237882 488 41924 205
Fertilizer 36 238535 488 41008 203
Fertilizer Mix 236768 487 41121 203
Polyethylene 240957 491 39710 199
Rubber 272481 522 44920 212
Sand 252112 502 44082 210
Soybeans 256266 506 42573 206
Water 247874 498 40083 200
(air). Each sample was analyzed for 1000 seconds. The reactor operated at 175 kW.
The data acquired from the neutron detector are shown in Table 4.16 and the data
from the HPGe detector are shown in Table 4.17 with the number of counts and standard
deviation obtained from the Genie software outputs. The figures-of-merit for the neutron
and neutron-induced gamma ray data with the fertilizer mix serving as the template are
listed in Table 4.18.
The results of this experiment do not conclusively distinguish the inert materials from
the simulated explosives. However, it is thought that the sample placement in relation to
the detector may be off so the detector cannot ”see” the sample.
4.2.6 October 3, 2007
This experiment is a rerun of the August 14, 2007 experiment. However, the bottom of the
HPGe detector’s dewar is raised 4.5 inches above the floor. The detector center is 31.75
inches above the floor, 57 inches from the beam port center , 52.75 inches from the reactor
and 39.75 inches from the box front. The cadmium covered neutron detector is 33.5 inches
above the floor, 64 inches from the reactor, 68 inches from the beam port centerline, and
32
25.5 inches from the box front.
The data acquired from the neutron detector are shown in Table 4.19 and the data
from the HPGe detector are shown in Table 4.20 with the number of counts and standard
deviation obtained from the Genie software outputs. The figures-of-merit for the neutron
and neutron-induced gamma ray data with the fertilizer 30 serving as the template are listed
in Table 4.21. The figures-of-merit for the neutron and neutron-induced gamma ray data
with the fertilizer 36 serving as the template are listed in Table 4.22. The figures-of-merit
for the neutron and neutron-induced gamma ray data with the fertilizer mix serving as the
template are listed in Table 4.23.
As shown in the above tables, the system is again generally able to distinguish between
explosives and non-explosives. These results can lead to the conclusion that the template
matching technique works for samples of quantities as small as one quart. The few instances
in which an inert sample’s figure-of-merit is less than the figure-of-merit if the simulated
explosives means that a few false positives might occur with very small sample sizes. It may
be that this can be remedied by calculating weight factors for each of the response energies
for the figure-of-merit equation.
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Table 4.15. August 6, 2007 Figures-of-Merit
Sample ς σ(ς)
Aluminum 932.593 7.815
Chalk 31.333 3.346
Fertilizer 30% 12.996 2.685
Fertilizer 36% 5.756 2.191
Polyethylene 75.842 4.173
Rubber 958.815 7.869
Sand 1084.831 8.116
Soybeans 233.357 5.527
Water 144.192 4.901
Table 4.16. Neutron Data - August 14, 2007
Sample Ri without Cd σ(Ri) Ri with Cd σ(Ri)
Air 49277 222 11492 107
Aluminum 77685 279 17069 131
Antifreeze 141169 376 25723 160
Chalk 127753 357 25415 159
Fertilizer 30 155121 394 30202 174
Fertilizer 36 140638 375 26977 164
Fertilizer Mix 172930 416 32327 180
Paint 134319 366 27197 165
Polyethylene 122400 350 22466 150
Rubber 150080 387 27655 166
Sand 119422 346 23859 154
Washer Fluid 174240 417 30305 174
Water 162772 403 28139 168
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Table 4.18. August 14, 2007 Figures-of-Merit
Sample ς σ(ς)
Air 6662.224 12.777
Aluminum 3470.337 10.854
Antifreeze 344.497 6.093
Chalk 670.935 7.198
Fertilizer 30% 91.905 4.379
Fertilizer 36% 330.283 6.029
Paint 445.270 6.496
Polyethylene 7469.561 13.147
Rubber 169.965 5.106
Sand 955.234 7.862
Washer Fluid 87.351 4.323
Water 135.422 4.824
Table 4.19. Neutron Data - October 3, 2007
Sample Ri without Cd σ(Ri) Ri with Cd σ(Ri)
Background 92499 304 20605 144
Aluminum 167923 410 34638 186
Antifreeze 246934 497 42326 206
Black Car Paint 250810 501 47148 217
Chalk 198578 446 38079 195
Fertilizer 30% 248896 499 45208 213
Fertilizer 36% 268469 518 47098 217
Fertilizer Mix 244523 494 44390 211
Polyethylene 255726 506 39318 198
Rubber 266663 516 45219 213
Sand 208050 456 40236 201
Water 266440 516 40465 201
Washer Fluid 294930 543 48515 220
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Table 4.21. October 3, 2007 Figures-of-Merit Using Fert30 as Template
Sample ς σ(ς)
Air 6787.405 12.836
Aluminum 1461.943 8.745
Antifreeze 54.016 3.834
Paint 13.300 2.701
Chalk 548.055 6.843
Fertilizer 30% 0.000 0.000
Fertilizer 36% 90.760 4.365
Fertilizer Mix 25.156 3.167
Polyethylene 106.896 4.547
Rubber 76.074 4.177
Sand 350.714 6.120
Washer Fluid 419.734 6.401
Water 134.489 4.816
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Table 4.22. October 3, 2007 Figures-of-Merit Using Fert 36 as Template
Sample ς σ(ς)
Air 8429.874 13.551
Aluminum 2278.584 9.821
Antifreeze 110.774 4.588
Paint 87.679 4.327
Chalk 1259.661 8.425
Fertilizer 30% 90.760 4.365
Fertilizer 36% 0.000 0.000
Fertilizer Mix 102.562 4.501
Polyethylene 125.094 4.834
Rubber 5.661 2.182
Sand 710.550 7.302
Washer Fluid 81.643 4.251
Water 162.468 5.049
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Table 4.23. October 3, 2007 Figures-of-Merit Using FertMix as Template
Sample ς σ(ς)
Air 6830.182 12.857
Aluminum 1462.510 8.747
Antifreeze 27.421 3.236
Paint 47.203 3.707
Chalk 711.563 7.304
Fertilizer 30% 25.156 3.167
Fertilizer 36% 102.562 4.501
Fertilizer Mix 0.000 0.000
Polyethylene 99.726 4.496
Rubber 81.942 4.255
Sand 285.141 5.811
Washer Fluid 480.482 6.621
Water 145.181 4.909
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Conclusions
The template matching technique for detection of explosive materials holds much promise.
It has been shown that the method can distinguish explosive surrogates from inert materials
when interrogated with neutrons. Samples of various sizes at a distances greater than a
meter were able to be identified as an explosive or non-explosive.
5.2 Recommendations
Further experimentation is still necessary to optimize this system. This should include
experimentation at various distances, experimentation with clutter, and experimentation
with different actual or simulated explosives. It is also recommended that these results
in this thesis and future experimentation be used to determine appropriate values of αi
(weight factors) for each energy ”i.” In addition, experimentation with a neutron generator
is necessary to make the system portable. The system should also be automated to perform
the interrogation, analysis, and give a positive or negative result with the click of a button.
Once these steps are complete, a template library can be created.
5.3 Additional Applications
Since the determination of the elements within an object is based upon comparison of sig-
natures, this device could be used in a vast number of applications. It could be employed
42
for quality control of foods or chemicals to ensure they are the appropriate composition. It
could be used to find illicit drugs or nuclear materials. Scientists could use it to test imported
goods for lead paint. The possibilities for its uses are endless.
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